

## Responsibility Sharing

### The Challenge: Finding A New Approach to Collective Defense Requirements

Throughout the Cold War, military contributions were a major measure of achieving an equitable degree of defense burdensharing. The military threat was enormous, immediate and well-understood. However, with the demise of the Soviet system, and the subsequent emergence of a radically different international and regional security environment, there is a need to consider a wider range of defense and security responses than was the case before. Political discourse and terms of reference must go beyond the narrow confines of Cold War-era focal points to encompass and comprehend a more complete range of allied security and defense contributions.

For this reason, the United States has eschewed the term "burdensharing" which has become associated with only one kind of contribution to mutual security, that of Host Nation Support (HNS) for forward-deployed troops. Instead the United States has adopted the term "responsibility sharing" to encompass the whole range of contributions states make to international security: defense spending, alliance and treaty commitments, foreign aid, peace-keeping contributions, and help preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as host-nation support.

The Administration remains committed to increased allied sharing of roles, risks, responsibilities, costs, and benefits of meeting common security goals and objectives. Military and defense efforts remain paramount among factors contributing to peace, security and stability in the post-Cold War

era. Resources and armed forces dedicated to the common defense continue to be the foundation of our cooperative security arrangements with allies.

Host nation support for U.S. forces based in Europe in itself remains an important aspect of responsibility sharing. Such support includes the costs and foregone revenue incurred by nations hosting U.S. forces. For example, Germany provided over \$1.43 billion in HNS in 1993. This consists of both foregone revenue (*i.e.*, waived rents, fees, and charges for land and facilities) and other payments such as labor, utilities, construction, and logistics support. Other European allies make similar contributions.

Some observers have suggested that our European allies should apply the "Japanese model" to their cost-sharing support. The situation in Japan, however, is not analogous to the situation in Europe, and therefore the "Japan model" is neither appropriate nor workable in Europe. Japan's contribution to the common defense consists of two elements, the 65-70 percent of U.S. stationing costs that are paid by Japan, and the overall Japanese defense effort, which is modest in terms of Japan's ability to contribute (1 percent of GDP). For our European allies, the combined effect of increased cost-sharing and sharply reduced military effort relative to ability to contribute would be a drop in annual defense spending from around \$195 billion to \$75 billion, a decline of 60 percent.

In addition to host nation support, we must consider a wide range of allied contributions to the common defense. In fact, we are placing greater reliance on our European NATO allies to take increased responsibility for meeting collective




regional defense requirements. This is an important implication, for example, of the January 1994 NATO Summit initiative on CJTF. As outlined earlier, this concept will allow the use of NATO assets by the WEU in support of crisis management or contingency operations of priority to Europeans, but of lesser importance to the United States.

Practical examples abound of the increased responsibility Europeans are taking for regional and collective security affairs.

A case in point is allied representation in actions designed to support the United Nations' mandates in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Our European NATO allies have provided the majority of forces assigned to execute Operations DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD. Similarly, NATO allies provide significant support to Operation PROVIDE PROMISE. NATO allies (including Canada) have contributed the vast majority of troops to support UN peacekeeping mandates within the FRY.

### Country Performance in Selected Responsibility Sharing Areas



NOTE: No set of selected indicators can fully convey the entire range of a nation's contributions. Readers are therefore urged to review this chart in conjunction with the discussions and data elsewhere in this report.

Source: *An Overview of the 1995 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, April 1995.






In other areas, NATO member states have provided significant force contributions to demanding tasks such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Last year, France, Britain, the United States and other nations participated in a *de facto* CJTF involving the transport and delivery of humanitarian and medical relief supplies to war-torn Rwanda. These operations—SUPPORT HOPE and TURQUOISE—are widely acknowledged to have averted a large-scale humanitarian crisis in central Africa. Most recently, European NATO allies participated with U.S. forces in mounting Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the emergency deployment of military assets to Kuwait in the fall of 1994 in response to Iraqi military provocations.

Overall, while the United States is still called upon to provide leadership and to offer prompt and innovative solutions to urgent defense and security problems, we have come to rely more heavily on coordinated but independent allied action in a wide range of political-military arenas. This does not signal an American withdrawal from the international scene, as much as it is an acknowledgment that common defense and security requirements can be met from a variety of alternative sources, allowing us to husband scarce resources and to achieve acceptable results by reliance on our allies and the synergy of combined force activities in pursuit of common goals.





DoD Photo by Stikkel

*Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium, May 25, 1994.*